Kriget Kommersoviet Cavalry In Ww2

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• Kriget Kommersoviet Cavalry In Ww2 War
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Order No. 227 (Russian: Приказ № 227, Prikaz No. 227) was an order issued on 28 July 1942 by Joseph Stalin, who was acting as the People's Commissar of Defence. It is known for its line 'Not a step back!' (Russian: Ни шагу назад!, romanized: Ni shagu nazad!),^[1] which became the primary slogan of the Soviet press in summer 1942.^[2]

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Names and dates. The war is known by several names. 'Polish–Soviet War' is the most common but other names include 'Russo–Polish War or Polish–Russian War of 1919–1921' (to distinguish it from earlier Polish–Russian wars) and 'Polish–Bolshevik War'.

Kriget Kommersoviet Cavalry In Ww2 Wwii

The order established that each front must create one to three penal battalions, which were sent to the most dangerous sections of the front lines.^[3] From 1942 to 1945, a total of 422,700 Red Army personnel were sentenced to penal battalions as a result of courts-martial.^[4] The order also directed that each army must create 'blocking detachments' at the rear that would shoot 'panic-mongers and cowards'.^[2] In the first three months, blocking detachments shot 1,000 penal troops and sent 24,000 to penal battalions. By October 1942, the idea of regular blocking detachments was quietly dropped.^[5]

Intended to galvanise the morale of the hard-pressed Red Army and emphasize patriotism, it had a generally detrimental effect and was not consistently implemented by commanders who viewed diverting troops to create blocking detachments as a waste of manpower. On 29 October 1944, blocking detachments were disbanded by Stalin's order No. 349 citing the changed situation at the front.^[6][7]

Text[edit]

During the first part of the war on the Eastern Front, the Soviets suffered heavy losses along with mass retreat and desertion. Stalin released order No. 227 intending to re-establish discipline in the Red Army in the battle against the Wehrmacht:^[8]

Moscow, Nr. 227, July 28, 1942

The enemy throws new forces to the front without regard to heavy losses and penetrates deep into the Soviet Union, seizing new regions, destroying our cities and villages, and violating, plundering and killing the Soviet population. Combat goes on in region Voronezh, near Don, in the south, and at the gates of the Northern Caucasus. The German invaders penetrate toward Stalingrad, to Volga and want at any cost to trap Kuban and the Northern Caucasus, with their oil and grain. The enemy already has captured Voroshilovgrad, Starobelsk, Rossosh, Kupyansk, Valuyki, Novocherkassk, Rostov on Don, half Voronezh. Part of the troops of the Southern front, following the panic-mongers, have left Rostov and Novocherkassk without severe resistance and without orders from Moscow, covering their banners with shame.

The population of our country, who love and respect the Red Army, start to be discouraged in her and lose faith in the Red Army, and many curse the Red Army for leaving our people under the yoke of the German oppressors, and itself running east.

Some stupid people at the front calm themselves with talk that we can retreat further to the east, as we have a lot of territory, a lot of ground, a lot of population and that there will always be much bread for us. They want to justify the infamous behaviour at the front. But such talk is a falsehood, helpful only to our enemies.

Each commander, Red Army soldier and political commissar should understand that our means are not limitless. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children. The territory of the USSR which the enemy has captured and aims to capture is bread and other products for the army, metal and fuel for industry, factories, plants supplying the army with arms and ammunition, railways. After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic republics, Donetzk, and other areas we have much less territory, much fewer people, bread, metal, plants and factories. We have lost more than 70 million people, more than 800 million pounds of bread annually and more than 10 million tons of metal annually. Now we do not have predominance over the Germans in human reserves, in reserves of bread. To retreat further - means to waste ourselves and to waste at the same time our Motherland.

Therefore it is necessary to eliminate talk that we have the capability endlessly to retreat, that we have a lot of territory, that our country is great and rich, that there is a large population, and that bread always will be abundant. Such talk is false and parasitic, it weakens us and benefits the enemy, if we do not stop retreating we will be without bread, without fuel, without metal, without raw material, without factories and plants, without railways.

This leads to the conclusion, it is time to finish retreating. Not one step back! Such should now be our main slogan.

It goes on to state that The Supreme General Headquarters of the Red Army commands:

1. Military councils of the fronts and first of all front commanders should:

a) Unconditionally eliminate retreat moods in the troops and with a firm hand bar propaganda that we can and should retreat further east, and that such retreat will cause no harm;

b) Unconditionally remove from their posts and send to the High Command for court-martial those army commanders who have allowed unauthorized troop withdrawals from occupied positions, without the order of the Front command.

c) Form within each Front from one up to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 persons) where commanders and high commanders and appropriate commissars of all service arms who have been guilty of a breach of discipline due to cowardice or bewilderment will be sent, and put them on more difficult sectors of the front to give them an opportunity to redeem by blood their crimes against the Motherland.

2. Military councils of armies and first of all army commanders should;

a) Unconditionally remove from their offices, corps and army commanders and commissars who have accepted troop withdrawals from occupied positions without the order of the army command, and route them to the military councils of the fronts for court-martial;

b) Form within the limits of each army 3 to 5 well-armed defensive squads (up to 200 persons in each), and put them directly behind unstable divisions and require them in case of panic and scattered withdrawals of elements of the divisions to shoot in place panic-mongers and cowards and thus help the honest soldiers of the division execute their duty to the Motherland;

c) Form within the limits of each army up to ten (depending on the situation) penal companies (from 150 to 200 persons in each) where ordinary soldiers and low ranking commanders who have been guilty of a breach of discipline due to cowardice or bewilderment will be routed, and put them at difficult sectors of the army to give them an opportunity to redeem by blood their crimes against the Motherland.

3. Commanders and commissars of corps and divisions should;

a) Unconditionally remove from their posts commanders and commissars of regiments and battalions who have accepted unwarranted withdrawal of their troops without the order of the corps or division commander, take from them their orders and medals and route them to military councils of fronts for court martial;

b) Render all help and support to the defensive squads of the army in their business of strengthening order and discipline in the units.

This order is to be read in all companies, cavalry squadrons, batteries, squadrons, commands and headquarters.

The People’s commissioner of Defense

I. Stalin

Effect[edit]

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Aleksandr Vasilevsky, wrote: '...Order N 227 is one of the most powerful documents of the war years due to its patriotic and emotional content... the document was motivated by rough and dark times... while reading it we, were thinking to ourselves if we were doing everything it takes to win the battle.'^[9]

No commander had the right to retreat without an order. Anyone who did so was subject to a military tribunal of the corresponding seniority level.

Order No. 227 established that each front must create one to three penal battalions (Russian: штрафной батальон, romanized: shtrafnoy batalyon, lit.'penalty battalion', commonly known as штрафбат, shtrafbat) of up to 800 middle-ranking commanders and high-ranking commanders accused of disciplinary problems. Penal battalions were sent to the most dangerous sections of the front lines.^[3] Each front had to create penal companies for privates and NCOs. By the end of 1942 there were 24,993 troops serving in penal battalions, which increased to 177,694 in 1943. The number decreased over the next two years to 143,457 and 81,766 soldiers in 1944 and 1945, respectively. The total of Red Army personnel sentenced by courts-martial was 994,300, with 422,700 assigned to penal battalions and 436,600 imprisoned after sentencing. Not included are 212,400 deserters, who were not found and escaped the custody of the military districts.^[4]

The order also directed that each army must create 'blocking detachments' (Russian: заградительный отряд, romanized: zagraditelny otryad, abbreviated to заградотряд, zagradotryad) at the rear that would shoot 'panic-mongers and cowards'.^[2] Both measures were cited in the preamble of the order as having been successfully used by the Germans during their winter retreat.

In the first three months, blocking detachments shot 1,000 penal troops and sent 24,000 to penal battalions.
According to an internal list of the NKVD from October 1942, 15,649 soldiers were picked up by the restricted forces who fled the front line on the Stalingrad Front from August 1, 1942 to October 15, 1942. Of these, 244 soldiers were imprisoned, 278 were shot, 218 were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions and 14,833 to return to their units.^[10] By October 1942, the idea of regular blocking detachments was quietly dropped.^[2][5]

Intended to galvanise the morale of the hard-pressed Red Army and emphasize patriotism, it had a generally detrimental effect and was not consistently implemented by commanders who viewed diverting troops to create blocking detachments as a waste of manpower. On 29 October 1944, blocking detachments were disbanded by order No. 349 of the People's Commissar of Defence (Stalin) citing the changed situation at the front.^[5][6][7]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

1. ^'Order No. 227, July 28, 1942, J. Stalin'. TracesOfWar.com. 1942-07-28. Retrieved 2020-12-07.
2. ^ ^abcdRoberts, Geoffrey (2006). Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. p. 132. ISBN0-300-11204-1. OCLC71164004.
3. ^ ^abToppe, Alfred (1998). Night Combat. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. p. 28. ISBN978-0-7881-7080-5.
4. ^ ^abKrivosheev, Grigori F (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses. London: Greenhill Books. pp. 91–92. ISBN1-85367-280-7. OCLC1023102965.
5. ^ ^abcMerridale, Catherine (2006). Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945. New York : Metropolitan Books. p. 158. ISBN0-8050-7455-4. OCLC60671899.
6. ^ ^abStarikov, Nikolai (19 May 2012). 'Ложь и правда о заградотрядах' [Lies and the truth about the detachments] (in Russian). Retrieved 15 September 2018.
7. ^ ^ab'ПРИКАЗ О РАСФОРМИРОВАНИИ ОТДЕЛЬНЫХ ЗАГРАДИТЕЛЬНЫХ ОТРЯДОВ № 0349 29 октября 1944' [Order for the Reforming of the Separate Blocking Detachments: No. 349, 29 October 1944]. Combat operations of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War (in Russian).
8. ^ This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Stalin, Joseph (28 July 1942). Order No. 227 by the People's Commissar of Defence of the USSR. Translated by Frank from www.stalingrad-info.com. Moscow – via Wikisource.
9. ^Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich (1973). Дело всей жизни [A Lifelong Cause] (in Russian). Moscow: Politizdat. OCLC236175083.
10. ^[Hill, Alexander: The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45. A documentary reader. Abingdon 2009, p. 103.]

References[edit]

• Sellas, Anthony (1992). The Value of Human Life in Soviet Warfare, New York: Routledge.
• History Channel, Monday 24 Nov 2008 @ 1400hr Eastern Time.

Further reading[edit]

• Geoffrey Roberts (2013). Victory at Stalingrad: The Battle That Changed History. Taylor & Francis. pp. 64–. ISBN978-1-317-86890-3.

The Crossing of the Düna (also known as Battle of Riga) took place during the Great Northern War on July 19 1701 near the city of Riga, present-day Latvia. The Swedish king Charles XII was in hot pursuit of king Augustus II the Strong of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Saxony. The crossing was easily made, and the coalition troops were quickly broken and retreated.

Prelude[edit]

During the first year of fighting in the Great Northern War, Charles XII of Sweden had delivered two crushing defeats on his enemies. In July 1700, he forced Frederick IV of Denmark out of the coalition against Sweden, after a brief landing on Humlebæk. He then settled to aid the besieged Narva (which at the time belonged to the Swedish Empire). On his arrival, late November, he managed to decisively defeat the Russians despite being heavily outnumbered, in the battle of Narva, which led to an end of the Russian campaign for the year. Charles then turned his attention against the south and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to deal with his last opponent—August the Strong—before going into Russia.^[5] The combined Saxon–Russian army of totally 29,000 men^[2] had entrenched themselves across the 600 meter wide Düna River under the command of Adam Heinrich von Steinau.^[1]

Orders were sent from the Swedish king to the governor-general of Livonia, Erik Dahlbergh, in preparations for the crossing before the arrival of the Swedish main army. Dahlbergh was ordered to obtain around 200 landing boats of different sizes and was also instructed to build a bridge in order to transfer the cavalry across the river. The operation was supposed to be done in strict confidentiality to ensure a surprise attack on the enemies.^[4] The Swedish army of 14,000 men^[2] arrived at Riga on July 17, and already by the time, preparations for the attack were completed. However, bad weather ruined the Swedish plans to attack instantly, and the assault had to be postponed.^[4] A Swedish cavalry regiment was left to threaten Kokenhusen, effectively forcing Steinau to split his forces,^[3] so the bulk of his army stayed across Riga.^[4]

The allied army was initially under the command of Saxon general Otto Arnold von Paykull and Ferdinand Kettler of Courland, who were both ensured of an easy victory. In their confidence, they prioritized their numbers, advantageous position, redoubts and Saxon courage in superiority over the Swedes. Prior to the battle, Kettler pronounced: 'even a superior force of three hundred thousand Swedes, would still not be enough, to successfully achieve any progress with the crossing'. The Saxon army was, however, deployed a distance away from the beach, to allow a few Swedish regiments to land, before it planned to massively strike with its full capacity to drive the Swedes back and capture the Swedish king (who was expected to be among the first to land.^[2]

Battle[edit]

Kriget Kommersoviet Cavalry In Ww2 War

During the evening of July 18, a little more than 6,000 Swedish infantry^[1] and 535 cavalry troops^[4] started to embark their landing boats in silence (there were about 195 boats of different structures and sizes, including four floating batteries with 10 cannons each and a corvette with 16 cannons).^[1] Swedish guns from Riga had continually bombarded the allied entrenchments across the river the same day and would continue doing so throughout the night and landing.^[4] After all the troops were embarked, the Swedes first torched some small boats and pushed them into the river, forming a smoke screen,^[6]:687 then at four o'clock in the morning of the 19th, the attack began.^[4]

Halfway across the river, after passing the cover afforded by the island of Fossenholm, the Swedes were discovered and fired at. The four Swedish floating batteries returned fire, and after half an hour, the Swedes reached the beach and were immediately thrown into fight against Saxon patrols. When about 3,000 Swedish troops were ashore, the Saxons launched their first major assault, with 3,500 men.^[1] However, the Swedish force under the personal command of the king himself, would not retreat and the attack was beaten back. The Swedes then sequentially stormed and took the nearby Garras redoubt which seized them ground of at least 200 paces inland, where they managed to establish a good foothold, covering the ongoing construction of the floating bridge.

After a brief stalemate, the Swedes formed up to initiate a second attack made by the Saxon general Otto Arnold von Paykull who strictly intended to drive them back before the arrival of further Swedish reinforcements. This attack, as the previous one, was repulsed. By this time the Saxon general Adam Heinrich von Steinau returned from Kokenhusen with large reinforcements and gained the command. He ordered a third assault on the Swedish stand, which at this time had almost every man ready from the landing. Since the Swedish left flank was protected by the river, Steinau gathered his cavalry in an attempt to attack the Swedish right which was rather unprotected. The attack had some success at first, but was subsequently beaten off after an ongoing attack in the rear by the Swedish cavalry.^[4][2]

At seven o'clock in the morning, Saxon commander Heinrich von Steinau went for a council of war with his generals and decided to withdraw from the battle. Another wave was thrown at the Swedes in order to cover the retreat.^[4] However, bad weather prevented final constructions of the bridge which denied the crossing of the Swedish cavalry and so August II slipped away with his army.^[4] The Swedes lost 100 men dead and another 400 wounded.^[4][1][7] The allied forces lost about 1,300 dead and wounded and another 700 captured. 36 artillery pieces and four standards and banners had also been conquered by the Swedes.^[4]

Kriget Kommersoviet Cavalry In Ww2 Ordnance

Aftermath[edit]

After the battle Charles laid siege and took Mitau (where he gained 8,000 muskets and 9,000 pistols) and then stormed the Cobron redoubt, where 400 Russians were stationed, only after a massacre the redoubt was taken with as few as twenty Russians still alive. Charles later laid siege to Dünamunde and shortly after started persecuting the retreating forces who had initially been 20,000 men strong during the fighting. The 10,000 strong Russian force under Anikita Ivanovich Repnin retreated towards Russia after having scarcely been participating in the main battle. The Saxons retreated to neutral Prussia and thus left all of Courland open for Charles who seized the initiative and took Kokenhusen.^[8][2][9]

In preparation for the crossing, king Charles XII had ordered to build the first bridge across the Daugava River, which was made of anchored and interconnected by ropes and boats. After the Swedish victory, the city was left with the structure. In 1705, the bridge, which had been lodged for the winter in Vējzaķsalas Bay, was washed away by the high spring waters. Later, the floating bridge was restored, but in 1710, it was again destroyed by the Russian army during the siege of Riga.^[10]

During the battle, small barges armed with cannons were used, thus combining land and sea forces as well as deception (smoke) to achieve a stunning victory, carefully planned and very well executed. Participants included Otto Arnold von Paykull.^[2]

See also[edit]

Sources[edit]

References[edit]

1. ^ ^abcdefgEricson (2003), p. 268-273
2. ^ ^abcdefghijFryxell (1861), p. 157-161
3. ^ ^abPeterson (2007), p. 252
4. ^ ^{abcdefghijklm}Larsson (2009), p. 108-111
5. ^Sundberg (2010), p. 206
6. ^Tucker, S.C., 2010, A Global Chronology of Conflict, Vol. Two, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, ISBN9781851096671
7. ^Ullgren (2008), p. 80-82
8. ^Kuvaja (2008), p. 148-153
9. ^Svensson (2001), p. 61-62
10. ^Riga municipality portal

Bibliography[edit]

• Olle Larsson, Stormaktens sista krig (2009) Lund, Historiska Media. ISBN978-91-85873-59-3
• Ericson, Lars m fl: Svenska Slagfält, Wahlström & Widstrand 2003, ISBN91-46-20225-0
• Peter Ullgren, Det stora nordiska kriget 1700-1721 (2008) Stockholm, Prisma. ISBN978-91-518-5107-5
• Ericson, Sjöslag och rysshärjningar (2011) Stockholm, Norstedts. ISBN978-91-1-303042-5
• Anders Fryxell, Berättelser ur svenska historien, Volym 21–22 (1861)
• Gary Dean Peterson, Warrior Kings of Sweden: The Rise of an Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (2007). McFarland.
• Ulf Sundberg, Sveriges krig 1630-1814 (2010) Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Bibliotek.
• Kuvaja, Christer, Krigen kring Östersjön - Karolinska krigare 1660-1721, Schildts Förlags AB, Helsingfors 2008
• Alex, Svensson, Karl XII som fältherre, Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Bibliotek, Stockholm 2001

Kriget Kommersoviet Cavalry In Ww2 Casualties

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